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COMMERCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CLAYTON ACT

The Clayton Act of 19141 supplemented the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act 2 and made substantive changes in the antitrust
law,3 declaring illegal all price discrimination, exclusive dealing and tying contracts, and mergers, when their effect may
be "substantially to lessen competition" or "tend to create a
monopoly" in "any line of commerce." '4 Like the Sherman Act,
the original Clayton Act was directed primarily to tactics of
national trusts; 5 however, changes in American industry and
economic institutions after 1914 rendered the Clayton Act
ineffective in dealing with many abuses that arose after its
passage.6 In response to these changes, Congress made major
revisions of Clayton §§ 2 and 3 in the Robinson-Patman Act of
1936,7 which was aimed at the predatory practices of the
developing large chain stores whose extraordinary leverage
over manufacturers threatened the independent merchant
and small businessman.8 The § 7 anti-merger provision of the
Clayton Act was extended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Act 9
1. Clayton Act §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1971),fonnerly ch. 323, §§ 1-26,
38 Stat. 730 (1914).
2. Sherman Anti-Trust Act §§ 1-8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1971),formerly ch. 647,
26 Stat. 209 (1890).
3. D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAYTON ACT 31 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as MARTIN]; H.R. REP. No. 627, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-17 (1936) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 627].
4. Clayton Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1971). See text beginning
at note 10, infra.
5. "Section 2 [Clayton's price discrimination section] was addressed to an
entirely different pricing problem of an earlier era: the predatory tactics of

national trusts to slash prices in certain localities for the purpose of eliminating smaller competing sellers." F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 6 (1962) [hereinafter cited as ROWE]. See H.R. REP.
No. 627 at 6-13.
6. See E. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 7 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as KINTNER). See also comments of Representative Utterback in H.R.
REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1936) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 2287].
7. 49 Stat. 1528 (1936). For a detailed account of the various bills proposing amendments to the Clayton Act see C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 21-28 (1959) [hereinafter cited as EDWARDS]; KINTNER at 11-14;
ROWE at 11-23.
8. H.R. REP. No. 2287 at 3. See Sen. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935); KINTNER at 7 explains that the FTC was unable to control the purchasing advantages of chain stores under section 2 of the original Clayton
Act because the Act authorized unlimited price differentials in the form of
quantity discounts.
9. 64 Stat. 1125, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950).

1976]

NOTES

1041

to prohibit mergers not only through acquisitions of corporate
stock but also through acquisitions of corporate assets.1 0
Sections 2, 3, and 7 of the amended Clayton Act 1 1 contain
differing jurisdictional prerequisites which must be satisfied
before a court can consider whether a substantive antitrust
violation has occurred. 12 Preliminary to every showing of
price discrimination under § 2(a), 13 the plaintiff' 4 must demonstrate contemporaneous sales, not merely offers to sell,
"in commerce," of commodities of like grade and quality;15 in
suits brought under Clayton §§ 2(d) 16 and 2(e) 1 7 the plaintiff
10. MARTIN at 252-53.

11. Clayton Act §§ 2, 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1971), formerly ch. 323, §§
2, 3, 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
12. Jurisdictional requirements in the context of a Clayton Act violation
mean more than mere allegations on the complaint that the court has subject
matter jurisdiction of the case because the case presents a federal question
and the jurisdictional amount is met. The Act names as jurisdictional requirements certain conditions that the plaintiff must demonstrate to the
court before the court will consider the lawfulness of the pricing transaction.
See KINTNER at 35-91.
13. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a): "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly
or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discriminationare in commerce ...where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of
such discrimination . . ." (emphasis added). Once the plaintiff makes a show-

ing of the jurisdictional prerequisites and price discrimination, a prima facie
violation has been established, and § 2(b) of Clayton shifts the burden of
rebutting the prima facie case to the person charged with the violation.
However, §§ 2(a) and 2(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a) and 13(b),
provide the seller with two defenses.
14. The plaintiff in the action may be either a private party, § 4 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, or the United States, Clayton Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. §
16.
15. Shaw's Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 333 (3d Cir. 1939); RoWE
at 51-52; KINTNER at 36-40; see text of statute at note 13, supra.
16. Clayton Act § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 13(d): "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything
of value to or for the benefit of a customer of such person in the course of such
commerce as compensation or in consideration for any services or facilities
furnished by or through such customer in connection with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers
competing in the distribution of such products or commodities" (emphasis
added).
17. Clayton Act § 2(e), 15 U.S.C. § 13(e): "It shall be unlawful for any
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must establish either offers to sell or actual sales "in commerce" of commodities of like grade and quality. Jurisdiction
under Clayton Act §§ 2(c),' s 3,19 and 720 can be exercised
whenever the plaintiff proves that any of the conduct prohibited under the provisions occurred "in commerce." The
commerce requirements can be classified by their language
into two categories: section 2(a) requires that the challenged
sales be made during the course of commerce by a person
engaged in commerce and that at least one of the sales be in
interstate commerce; 21 the language of Clayton Act §§ 2(c),

person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser
or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, with or without processing,
by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing
of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, or
offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to
all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." This section does not contain
any commerce requirement, but the courts have cured the "patently inadvertent" omission by reading in the commerce requirement. E.g., Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1945); see ROWE at
390-94.
18. Clayton Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c): "It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to pay or grant,
or to receive or accept, anything of value as a commission, brokerage, or
other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for
services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods, wares, or
merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to an agent...
or other intermediary" (emphasis added).
19. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale
or contract for sale of goods ....

or other commodities .

.

. or fix a price

charged therefore, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall
not use or deal in the goods ....
or other commodities of a competitor or
competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce" (emphasis added).
20. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18: "No corporation engaged in commerce
shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federkl Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly . .
(emphasis added).
21. Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a), see note 13, supra. "In order to
state a cause of action based on unlawful price discrimination under . . .
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2(d), 3, and 7 simply requires that the violation be committed
during the course of commerce by someone engaged in com22
merce.
In Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Company2 the United
States Supreme Court considered the meaning of the complicated commerce requirements of portions of the Clayton and
Robinson-Patman Acts. Reversing the intermediate court
which dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, 24 the Court affirmed the district court's judgment that the defendant was
guilty of selling bread at discriminatory prices in violation of
§ 2(a) of the Clayton Act. 25 Although the price cutting occurred
entirely within New Mexico, the Court found one of the
defendant's New Mexico plants was "engaged in commerce"
within the meaning of the Acts because the plant made bread
deliveries, at the regular price, to purchasers in a neighboring Texas town. 26 The relevant inquiry according to lower
federal court decisions had been whether any of the discriminatory purchases under § 2(a) were "in interstate commerce." 27 Yet, Justice Douglas's majority opinion emphasized
that the money used to finance the price cutting in New
Mexico derived from the bread company's profits from interstate commerce, ' and stated that an interstate business's
use of profits from its interstate sales to finance discriminatory intrastate price cutting satisfied the jurisdictional re29
quirements of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act.
[Clayton Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)], it must be alleged that there were two
sales made by the same person to two different purchasers at different
prices, and that at least one of these sales was in interstate commerce ....
"
Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. P. Ballantine & Sons Co., 129 F. Supp. 736,
739 (D.C. Mass. 1955).
22. Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408 (D. Conn. 1950). See text of
statutes at notes 16, 18-20, supra.
23. 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
24. 208 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1953).
25. 348 U.S. at 120. The Court also concluded that the price cutting
violated § 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
26. Id. at 116.
27. E.g., Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453, 458
(5th Cir. 1949); Danko v. Shell Oil Co., 115 F. Supp. 886, 887 (E.D.N.Y. 1953);
Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 675 (S.D. Cal. 1951); Lewis v. Shell Oil
Co., 50 F. Supp. 547, 548-49 (N.D. Ill. 1943).
28. 348 U.S. at 119.
29. Id. Justice Douglas explained, "The victim, to be sure, is only a local
merchant; and no interstate transactions are used to destroy him .... If this
method of competition were approved, the pattern for growth of monopoly

1044

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Moore, however, did not signify the beginning of a more
expansive interpretation of § 2(a) of the Clayton Act. The
lower federal courts continued to adhere to their pre-Moore
reasoning, and most have held that to establish actionable
price discrimination a plaintiff must prove that at least one of
the discriminatory sales crossed state lines. 30 Though the
Moore decision has not been ignored totally, 3 1 the circuit
courts of appeals generally agree that Justice Douglas utilized
unnecessarily broad language in Moore, and that the real key
to the decision was the interstate character of the sales from
New Mexico to Texas. 32 Thirteen years after Moore, the Tenth
Circuit in Food Basket, Inc. v. Albertson's, Inc. 33 suggested
that the Supreme Court had sanctioned implicitly the lower
courts' restrictive reading of the Moore decision by repeatedly
34
denying certiorari in cases subsequent to Moore.
While the lower federal courts were adhering to a strict
interpretation of the commerce requirements of Clayton Act §
2(a),35 cases involving §§ 2(c), 2(d), 3, and 7 of the amended
Clayton Act 36 suggested that because the commerce language
of these sections is less specific than in § 2(a), these sections
would be simple. As long as the price warfare was strictly intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with impunity at the expense of
local merchants." Id.
30. Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178 (10th Cir. 1972); Cliff Food
Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 208-10 (5th Cir. 1969); The Borden
Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1964); Willard Dairy Corp. v. Nat'l
Dairy Prod. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962).
31. Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 456 F.2d 225, 226 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 483
F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1973), held that "a complaint under the Robinson-Patman
Act need not allege that one of the sales involved was interstate in character
as long as it charges that interstate sales were used to underwrite allegedly
intrastate price cutting."
32. Stough v. May & Co., 484 F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1973); Food Basket, Inc.
v. Albertson, Inc., 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967); Willard Dairy Corp. v.
Nat'l Dairy Prod. Corp., 309 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1962); Central Ice Cream
Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 287 F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1961).
33. 383 F.2d 785, 787 (10th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. See, e.g., Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp.,
486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Walker Oil Co. v.
Hudson Oil Co., 414 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1042 (1970);
Cream Crest-Blending Dairies, Inc. v. National Dairy Prod., 370 F.2d 332 (6th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 930 (1967).
85. See cases cited at note 30, supra.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(c), (d), (f), 14, 18; see text of these provisions at notes
16, 18-20, supra.
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are susceptible of a broader interpretation.3 7 Hence, violations occurring in connection with intrastate sales usually
are sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction under these
sections if committed by a business engaged in interstate
38
commerce.
In determining whether the commerce requirements of
Clayton §§ 2(c), 2(d), 3, and 7 have been met, the courts have
implicitly borrowed the jurisdictional analysis used in alleged
Sherman Act violations. 39 The Sherman Act declares illegal
"every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states ....,,4o By judicial interpretation, the commerce requirement of the Sherman Act can be met by the
plaintiff's showing that the challenged conduct substantially
affects interstate commerce, though the conduct itself might
be wholly intrastate. 41 On the other hand, when interpreting
the anti-price discrimination provisions of Clayton Act § 2(a),
courts uniformly reject the Sherman Act test on the basis of §
2(a)'s narrower language and consistently require that at
least one of the discriminatory sales involves interstate pur42
chasing of commodities.
In 1974, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Copp Paving Co. 43 and for the first time since the 1954
Moore decision, considered the commerce requirements of the
Clayton Act.44 Copp Paving Company filed suit against three
37. Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148 (D.
Minn. 1967), 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968); Shreveport Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
321 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1963), J.H. Filbert, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 359 (1957).
38. Id.
39. Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 744-45 (1945); Rangen,
Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 861 (9th Cir. 1965); McCormack v.
Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 158, 163 (D. Minn. 1968).
40. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1971).
41. Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321 (1967); United States v. Women's
Sportswear Mfr's. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
42. See cases cited at note 30, supra. In the context of assessing an
alleged Sherman Act violation, the Fifth Circuit in Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
464 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1972), recognized the difference between the commerce
requirements of Clayton Act § 2(a) and Sherman Act § 1, saying that the
commerce language of § 2(a) was "far narrower in scope than the 'effect on
commerce' test applicable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Id. at 37.
43. 419 U.S. 186 (1974), cert. granted, 415 U.S. 988 (1974).
44. The Ninth Circuit had found for the plaintiff on the basis of the
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oil companies, suppliers of liquid asphalt in interstate commerce, and two other firms, competing producers and sellers
of asphaltic concrete in the Los Angeles area. The Ninth
Circuit exercised jurisdiction over the alleged violations of §§
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and §§ 2(a), 3, and 7 of the Clayton
Act because the asphaltic concrete was produced by firms
that sold more than a de minimis share of their concrete for
use in the construction of local segments of the interstate
highway system. 45 Rejecting this "nexus to commerce"
theory,46 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit deci47
sion.
The Court went beyond a mere declaration that the
"nexus to commerce" theory was insufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the facts presented; it considered whether § 2(a)
of the Clayton Act should be interpreted according to the
Sherman Act's "effect on commerce" test.48 In rejecting any
application of the Sherman Act analysis to § 2(a), the Supreme Court relied on the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman bill. 49 The bill as originally proposed contained
specific language making price discrimination unlawful
"whether in commerce or not. 5 0° Congress deleted this language and replaced it with the requirement that "either or
any of the purchases involved" must be in interstate commerce. 5 1 The Court thought this change was significant,
though not controlling, and found further support for its position in four decades of circuit court interpretation consisdefendant's violation of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and the RobinsonPatman Act. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari specifically limited "to the
questions arising under the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts." 419 U.S. at
193.

45. In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1973).
46. The "nexus to commerce" theory seems to be an application of the
Court's reasoning in cases interpreting the "engaged in commerce" provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1971). See Alstate
Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318
U.S. 125 (1943).
47. 419 U.S. at 199. The Ninth Circuit decision was reversed only as to
the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act issues since the Sherman Act
violation was not considered by the court.
48. Id. at 202.
49. Id. at 200.
50. W. PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 323 (1938); H.R. REP. No.

8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
51. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936).
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tently rejecting the "effect on commerce" approach and requiring that at least one of the discriminatory purchases
cross state lines. 52 Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. was reconciled with the later jurisprudence, the Court treating Justice
Douglas's broad language as merely indicative of the extent
of Congress's commerce power,5 3 which the Court concluded
had not been exercised to its limits when Congress enacted
the jurisdictional requirements of Clayton Act § 2(a).
The Court also considered the jurisdictional requirements
of §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, and in dictum concluded that
their legislative history did not support the argument that
the broad Sherman test should be used to interpret their
commerce requirements. 54 However, the Court avoided a
definitive ruling on the jurisdictional requirements of §§ 3
and 7 of the Clayton Act by concluding that regardless of the
interpretation placed upon the commerce requirements, the
complaint would have to be dismissed because no evidence of
an interstate transaction or any effect on commerce had been
55
presented.
Less than a year later, in United States v. American
Building Maintenance Industries,56 the Supreme Court took
up the jurisdictional question left open in Copp Paving,
whether the commerce language of § 7 of Clayton could be
interpreted according to the "effect on commerce" test of the
Sherman Act. The Government sued American Building
Maintenance Industries, one of the nation's largest suppliers
of janitorial services, claiming the company's acquisition of
two janitorial service firms supplying intrastate services violated § 7. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding
that the complaint did not allege the jurisdictional requirements necessary for a § 7 violation because at the time of the
acquisition neither of the two acquired firms was "engaged in
commerce" within the meaning of § 7.57
52. 419 U.S. at 200.
53. Id. at 200-01 n.17.
54. Id. at 201.
55. Id. at 202. Citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. at 230-34,
the Court held: "The plaintiff must allege and prove that apparently local
acts in fact have adverse consequences on interstate markets and the interstate flow of goods in order to invoke federal antitrust prohibitions." Id.
56. 422 U.S. 271 (1975).
57. Id. at 284-86. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme
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Before applying the anti-merger prohibition of Clayton
Act § 7, federal courts consistently have required that both
the acquired firm and the acquiring firm be "engaged in
commerce." 58 Since American Building was so engaged, the
issue was whether the jurisdictional prerequisites were met
by the acquired janitorial companies' intrastate servicing of
businesses engaged in interstate commerce, or by a showing
that their acquisition by American Building adversely affected interstate commerce. The Supreme Court held that
Clayton § 7 is not coextensive with congressional power under
the commerce clause and that the § 7 jurisdictional require59
ments cannot be equated with those of the Sherman Act.
The Court defined "engaged in commerce" as "engaged in the
flow of interstate commerce," and "to be engaged 'in commerce' within the meaning of section 7, a corporation must
itself be directly engaged in the production, distribution, or
' 60
acquisition of goods or services in interstate commerce.
The Court gave three reasons for its narrow interpretation. First, both § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 6 '
and § 7 of the Clayton Act were enacted during the 63rd
session of Congress and were directed toward maintaining
free competition;6 2 thus, the Court concluded that their commerce language reasonably could be given similar constructions. In 1941, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Bunte Brothers3
had rejected the theory that § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act could be used against intrastate firms whose
activities merely affected interstate commerce.6 The Court
also cited the legislative history of the 1950 amendments to
Court from the United States district court pursuant to § 2 of the Expediting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1971). Id. at 273 n.1.
58. E.g., United States v. Citizen Publishing Co., 280 F. Supp. 978 (D.
Ariz. 1968). See text of Clayton Act § 7 at note 20, supra.
59. 422 U.S. at 283.
60. Id.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1971): "Unfair methods of competition in commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful." Congress recently replaced the § 5 "in commerce" language with "in or
affecting commerce." See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, PUB. L. No. 93-637 § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2193, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1975 Supp.).
62. H.R. REP. NO. 2287 at 6-7.'

63. 312 U.S. 349 (1941).
64. Id. at 351.
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Clayton Act § 7 in the Celler-Kefauver Act. 65 By 1950, the
lower federal courts had distinguished between "in commerce" and "affecting commerce '6 6 and had limited application of Clayton § 7 to situations involving the former.6 7 While
trying to close the loopholes of § 7 in 1950, Congress left
untouched the narrowly interpreted commerce requirement,
leaving the impression that Congress (lid not intend to extend
§ 7 to the constitutional limits of its power. 68 Finally, the
Court was guided by precedent, which uniformly restricted
enforcement of the prohibitions of § 7 to mergers in which
both the acquired and the acquiring firms were directly doing
business in interstate commerce.6 9
Undoubtedly, the rationale of the decision in American
Building will not be limited to § 7 but will be expanded by
analogy to give content to the commerce requirements of §9
2(c), 2(d), and 3 of the Clayton Act. If so, the difference in the
commerce requirements between § 2(a) and §§ 2(c), 2(d), 3, and
7 will have been rendered nugatory. Taken together, Copp
Paving and American Building provide a consistently narrow
construction of the jurisdictional commerce requirements of
the Clayton Act. They have probably eliminated the possibility of a wider application of the Clayton Act that would result
from use of an "effect on commerce" test or by reliance on the
broad language of Moore, and perhaps have encouraged, in
intrastate transactions, predatory practices which Congress
made illegal in the interstate sphere.
Sarah Weckel Hays
65. 422 U.S. 280-81. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
66. A distinction between direct and indirect effects on commerce (i.e. "in
commerce" versus "affecting commerce") was made as early as 1935 in
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-48 (1935). E.g.,
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120-26 (1942). The courts
think that Congress has also recognized this difference. In Bunte Brothers,
312 U.S. 349, 351 (1941), the Court states that when Congress has regulated
local activities through the use of the commerce power it has conveyed its
intent explicitly as in 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(7), 159(c), 160(a) (1971), 45 U.S.C. § 51
(1971).
67. 422 U.S. 280.
68. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1949).
69. 422 U.S. at 282. See case cited at note 58, supra.

